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SIMPLIFYING THE PROPHECY OF JUSTICIABILITY
IN CASES CONCERNING FOREIGN AFFAIRS:
A POLITICAL ACT OF STATE QUESTION
Deborah Azar
Justiciability doctrines in the foreign affairs arena have been described
as involving large elements of prophecy. First, this article will examine
the justifications and application of the political question doctrine in
cases involving foreign affairs.  Second, this article will discuss the jus-
tifications and application of the act of state and political question doc-
trines.  Third, this article will analyze whether the act of state doctrine
can be encompassed within the political question doctrine.  Fourth, this
article will propose a framework that can be applied in cases involving
political questions in foreign affairs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Justiciability doctrines in the foreign affairs arena have been
described as involving large elements of prophecy.1  In the oral argu-
ments for Austria v. Altmann2 Justice Breyer suggested the act of
state doctrine apply in the following way:
[T]here’s a foreign policy interest here, and so that way
the State Department’s in control, and if it feels that it
would hurt foreign affairs to have the suit go ahead, it
says either act of state if it’s not clear or a statement of
interest, and a - which is a kind of political question, I
guess.3
Due to the confusion about and overlap of the justiciability doc-
trines, there has been a call for their consolidation.4
This article will argue that the act of state doctrine should be a
subcategory of the political question doctrine, because both notions are
based on the same principles and are applied in the same way, and
this would simplify the application of justiciability doctrines in cases
1 Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of
executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.
Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the po-
litical departments of the government, Executive and Legisla-
tive. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of
prophecy.  They are and should be undertaken only by those di-
rectly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or
imperil.  They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long
been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to
judicial intrusion or inquiry.
Id.
2 Transcript of Oral Argument, Aus. v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (No. 03-13),
available at 2004 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 15; Audio Tape: The Oyez Project, Aus. v.
Altmann—Oral Argument (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://oyez.org/cases/2000-
2009/2003/2003_03_13/argument.
3 The Oyez Project, supra note 2, at 22:52.
4 Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677,
700 (1990).
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concerning foreign affairs.5  One of the situations in which the Su-
preme Court deems the political question doctrine applicable is in
cases involving foreign affairs.6  The justifications for deeming cases
involving foreign affairs non-justiciable are based on separation of
powers and the fact that those issues demand that the government
speak with one voice.7  The act of state doctrine, stating that courts in
the United States will not adjudicate cases involving public acts of a
recognized foreign sovereign in its own territory,8 is based on these
same considerations.9  Therefore, the act of state doctrine should be
analyzed under the umbrella of the political question doctrine.10
First, this article will examine the justifications and applica-
tion of the political question doctrine in cases involving foreign af-
fairs.11  Second, this article will discuss the justifications and
application of the act of state and political question doctrines.12  Third,
this article will analyze whether the act of state doctrine can be en-
compassed within the political question doctrine.13  Fourth, this article
will propose a framework that can be applied in cases involving politi-
cal questions in foreign affairs.14
II. BACKGROUND
A. Application of the Political Question Doctrine in International
Cases
1. What is a Political Question in Cases Involving Foreign Affairs?
The political question doctrine is based on the relationship be-
tween the judicial branch and the other branches of the federal govern-
ment.15  The non-justiciability “of a political question is primarily a
function of the separation of powers.”16  Whether a case presents a po-
litical question must be decided on a case-by-case basis.17  The political
question doctrine involves “[d]eciding whether a matter has in any
measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of gov-
5 See infra Part V.
6 See infra notes 15-32 and accompanying text.
7 See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
8 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964); Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
9 See infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
10 See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
11 See infra Part II A.
12 See infra Part II B.
13 See infra Part III.
14 See infra Part IV.
15 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 210-11.
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ernment, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever au-
thority has been committed.”18
The factors that a court must take into account when deciding
whether a case falls within the political question doctrine are:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; the impossibility of deciding without an ini-
tial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; the impossibility of a court’s undertaking in-
dependent resolution without expressing lack of the re-
spect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrass-
ment from multifarious pronouncements by various de-
partments on one question.19
The political question doctrine has roots in a seminal case for
the exercise of judicial review.20  In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme
Court held that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judi-
cial department to say what the law is.”21  However, in that case the
Court also mentioned that cases involving mere political acts, belong-
ing to the executive department alone, are not to be adjudicated by the
Supreme Court.22  The Court wondered if the case at hand involved a
political question:
Is it in the nature of the transaction?  Is the act of
delivering or withholding a commission to be considered
as a mere political act, belonging to the executive depart-
ment alone, for the performance of which, entire confi-
dence is placed by our constitution in the supreme
executive; and for any misconduct respecting which, the
injured individual has no remedy[?]  That there may be
such cases is not to be questioned; but that every act of
duty, to be performed in any of the great departments of
government, constitutes such a case, is not to be
admitted.23
The concept of political question was clarified in Luther v. Bor-
den, where the Court held that where the Constitution has treated a
18 Id. at 211.
19 Id. at 217.
20 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
21 Id. at 177.
22 Id. at 164.
23 Id.
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subject as political in its nature and placed the power in another
branch of government, the courts cannot exercise their power.24
The Constitution of the United States has treated
the subject as political in its nature, and placed the
power of recognizing a State government in the hands of
Congress.  Under the existing legislation of Congress,
the exercise of this power by courts would be entirely in-
consistent with that legislation.  The President of the
United States is vested with certain power by an act of
Congress, and in this case he exercised that power by
recognizing the charter government.25
The Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr argued that issues con-
cerning foreign relations are political questions.26  The Court ex-
plained that many questions concerning foreign relations “turn on
standards that defy judicial application,” “involve the exercise of a dis-
cretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature,” or
“uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government’s
views.”27  In Baker v. Carr, risking the “embarrassment of our govern-
ment abroad” was cited as a case of political question, contrasting that
scenario with the case actually decided.28  “The cases concerning . . .
foreign affairs, for example, are usually explained by the necessity of
the country’s speaking with one voice in such matters.”29
24 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 2 (1849).
25 Id.
[Luther v. Borden] arose out of the Dorr rebellion of 1842 against
the charter government of Rhode Island.  The traditional view of
the case is that when asked to consider whether the charter gov-
ernment violated the article IV, section 4 guarantee of a republi-
can form of government, the Court invoked the political question
doctrine because of the commitment to the other branches of the
decision as to which is the lawful state government; the unam-
biguous action by the President, in recognizing the charter gov-
ernment as the lawful authority; the need for finality in the
executive’s decision; and the lack of criteria by which a court
could determine which form of government was republican.
Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV.
1031, 1036 (1984).
26  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962).
27 Id. at 211.
28 Id. at 226 (holding that reapportionment of  voting districts does not constitute
a political question and is a justiciable matter).
29 Id. at 281.
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However, courts have discretion in determining if a case in-
volves matters concerning justiciability,30 and the fact that a case falls
within the realm of foreign affairs does not mean that a court will not
decide it.31  The Court reserves the exercise of discretion in applying
the political question doctrine: “Of course, judgment concerning the
‘political’ nature of even a controversy affecting the Nation’s foreign
affairs is not a simple mechanical matter, and [several] of the Court’s
decisions have accorded scant weight to the consideration of unity of
action in the conduct of external relations.”32
2. Justifications for the Political Question Doctrine
There has been a lot of debate concerning the justifications,
and even some doubt as to the existence33 of the political question doc-
trine.34  This article will compare the classical,35 prudential,36 and ag-
gregate37 theories that have been used to justify the political question
doctrine.
The classical theory, argued by Wechsler,38 states that the po-
litical question doctrine should only be used when the Constitution has
committed the determination of the issue in question to another
branch of the government.39  In contrast, the prudential theory, ar-
gued by Bickel,40 holds that the political question doctrine is based on:
30 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., A Neo-Federalist Analysis of Federal Question Juris-
diction, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1568 (2007).
31 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)
32 See id. at 211 (citing Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948); U.S.
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)).
33 See generally Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE
L.J. 597 (1976).
34 See infra notes  46-48 and accompanying text.
35 See generally Redish, supra note 25, at 1039.
36 See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 183-98 (1962).
37 The theory proposed by Louis Henkin does not have a label.  This comment will
call it aggregate theory because it maintains that the political question is an ag-
gregate of existing doctrines and principles. See generally Henkin, supra note 33.
38 Herbert Wechsler (1909-2000) was a professor at Columbia Law School and the
director of the American Law institute for twenty-one years.  Professor Wechsler
specialized in constitutional law, federal courts, and criminal law.  Tamar Lewin,
Herbert Wechsler, Legal Giant, Is Dead at 90, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2000, at C21,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/28/us/herbert-wechsler-legal-giant-
is-dead-at-90.html.
39 “Wechsler has argued that the only appropriate use of a political question doc-
trine is to guide the Court in deciding under what circumstances ‘the Constitution
has committed to another agency of government [than the courts] the . . . determi-
nation of the issue.’” Redish, supra note 25, at 1039.
40 Alexander Bickel (1924-1974) was a professor at Yale Law School who special-
ized in constitutional law.  Lawrence Van Gelder, Alexander M. Bickel Dies; Con-
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the Court’s sense of lack of capacity, compounded in une-
qual parts of (a) the strangeness of the issue and its in-
tractability to principled resolution; (b) the sheer
momentousness of it, which tends to unbalance judicial
judgment; (c) the anxiety, not so much that the judicial
judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should but
will not be; (d) finally (“in a mature democracy”), the in-
ner vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution which
is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw
strength from.41
The prudential theory seems to stem from a legal realistic ap-
proach to jurisprudence.42  In response to this theory, but still within a
prudential and legal realistic perspective, Jaffe43 argues that the prob-
lem is not that the courts cannot develop workable standards that
would solve the issue in question in each specific case, but that the
courts should not develop those standards because society would be
either better off without rules, or rules should only be one factor
among other considerations that a court should take into account.44
One of the dominant considerations is “the lack of satisfactory criteria
for a judicial determination.”45
On the other hand, Henkin46 contends that the political ques-
tion doctrine does not exist.47  Henkin concludes that the political
stitutional Law Expert; A Legal Conservative, N.Y. TIMES, November 8, 1974, at
ABS 42.
41 Redish, supra note 25, at 1043 (citing BICKEL, supra note 36, at 183-98).
42 Legal realism is a theory of jurisprudence that maintains that the law is the
creation of judges responding to individual facts and policies.  Brian Leiter, Re-
thinking Legal Realism: Toward A Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV.
267, 275-76 (1997).
43 Louis Jaffe (1906-1996) was a professor at Harvard Law School who specialized
in administrative law. Louis L. Jaffe, 90, Noted Legal Scholar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
15, 1996, at ABS 168, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/15/us/louis-l-
jaffe-90-noted-legal-scholar.html.
44 Jaffe, however, has argued that in certain instances the point is not that the
courts cannot develop workable standards, but that they should not.  Many of the
questions that arise are of the sort for which we do not choose, or have not been
able as yet to establish, strongly guiding rules.  We may believe that the job is
better done without rules, or that even though there are applicable rules, these
rules should be only among the numerous relevant considerations. Redish, supra
note 25, at 1047.
45 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939).
46 Louis Henkin is a professor emeritus at Columbia Law School who specializes
in constitutional and international law.  http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Louis_
Henkin.
47 Henkin, supra note 33, at 598-99.
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question doctrine is an unnecessary packaging of several established
doctrines, but is no more than the sum of its parts.48
B. Act of State Doctrine
1. What Is the Act of State Doctrine?
The act of state doctrine49 states that courts in the United
States,50 both federal and state,51 cannot adjudicate public acts that a
recognized foreign sovereign power commits within its own territory.52
This doctrine is applicable when the relief sought would require a
court in the United States to declare invalid an official act of a foreign
sovereign.53  It does not matter whether the act violates domestic law
of the foreign country or international law.54  The act of state doctrine
is not compelled by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.55
48 Id. at 622.
49 For a good summary of the act of state doctrine, including its exceptions and
application, see Andrew D. Patterson, The Act of State Doctrine Is Alive and Well:
Why Critics of the Doctrine are Wrong, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 111
(2008).
50 Courts in other common law jurisdictions also apply the act of state doctrine.
See Aksionairnoye Obschestvo A. M. Luther  v. James Sagor & Co. [1921] 3 KB
532, 548; Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz [1929] 1 KB 718, 725; Buttes Gas and Oil
Co v. Hammer (No 3) [1982] AC 888.
51 See Matter of Doe, 868 N.Y.S.2d 40, 46 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); People v. Al-
monte, 740 N.Y.S.2d 763, 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Atty. Griev. Comm’n v.
Sheinbein, 812 A.2d 981, 1016 (Md. 2002); Roxas v. Marcos, 969 P.2d 1209, 1246-
47 (Haw. 1998).
52 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964); Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
53 World Wide Minerals, LTD. v. Republic of Kaz., 296 F.3d 1154, 1164 (2002)
(quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401 (1964)).
54 Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
55 Id. at 421.
We do not believe that this doctrine is compelled either by
the inherent nature of sovereign authority, as some of the earlier
decision[s] seem to imply. . . .  If a transaction takes place in one
jurisdiction and the forum is in another, the forum does not by
dismissing an action or by applying its own law purport to divest
the first jurisdiction of its territorial sovereignty; it merely de-
clines to adjudicate or makes applicable its own law to parties or
property before it.  The refusal of one country to enforce the pe-
nal laws of another . . . is a typical example of an instance when a
court will not entertain a cause of action arising in another juris-
diction.  While historic notions of sovereign authority do bear
upon the wisdom [of] employing the act of state doctrine, they do
not dictate its existence. .
Id.
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Modern act of state doctrine has its roots in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, where56  the Supreme Court applied the act of
state doctrine to uphold an expropriation by the Cuban government as
a defense to the rights of an American commodity broker to a cargo of
sugar under a bill of lading.57
The District Court for the Central District of California has ap-
plied Sabbatino by analyzing three factors:
(1) ‘the greater the degree of codification or consensus
concerning a particular area of international law, the
more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render deci-
sions regarding it;’ (2) ‘the less important the implica-
tions of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker
the justification for exclusivity in the political branches;’
and (3) whether ‘the government which perpetrated the
challenged act of state is no longer in existence.’58
However, the Supreme Court in Sabbatino did not apply those
three factors to the facts of the case in the way that the district court
did, merely by counting which factors were met and which factors were
not.59  Instead, the Supreme Court in Sabbatino used those factors,
along with others, to explain the rationale of the act of state doctrine.60
The act of state doctrine cannot be applied inconsistently with
sovereign immunity.61  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act62 lists
many exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity, such as an action
based on commercial activity, cases in admiralty, and actions in viola-
tion of international law.63  Such exceptions leave open lacunae where
the act of state doctrine operates.64
The act of state doctrine also leaves a lot of discretion to the
courts in its application.  In W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environ-
mental Tectonics Corp., International, the Supreme Court stated that
56 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 420.
57 Id. at 401-08; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 176 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting WIL-
LIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 380 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d
Am. ed. 1919)). A bill of lading is a document that represents at the same time: a
receipt for the goods shipped, the contract with the terms of the shipping, and title
to the goods shipped before they arrive at their destination.
58 Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1190 (2005) (quot-
ing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964)).
59 Compare Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 420, with Mujica,
381 F. Supp. 2d at 1190-91.
60 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-28.
61 See id. at 430.
62 28 USCS § 1602-11 (1976).
63 Id. at § 1605.
64 See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 674 (1980); Callejo v.
Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1112 (1985).
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“sometimes, even though the validity of the act of a foreign sovereign
within its own territory is called into question, the policies underlying
the act of state doctrine may not justify its application.”65
2. The Act of State Doctrine and Erie
The status of the act of state doctrine after Erie v. Tompkins is
not settled.66  Under the Erie doctrine,67 except for matters governed
by the Constitution or by federal statutes, federal courts must apply
the common law substantive rules of the state in which they sit.68  Af-
ter the Erie decision, there is no longer federal common law.69  How-
ever, there is controversy about the status of international federal
common law following the decision.70  Specifically, there is still contro-
versy regarding the role of federal non-statutory law concerning for-
eign relations after Erie.71  Revisionists claim that there needs to be
authorization from Congress prior to the application of customary in-
ternational law in federal courts.72 Traditionalists, by contrast, claim
that customary international law is self-executing, and thus federal
courts do not need congressional authorization to apply customary in-
ternational law.73  Traditionalists read the holding of Erie narrowly to
mean that “because ‘Congress has no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a State,’ there is a corresponding
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the federal judiciary to fashion a fed-
eral common law of tort.”74  Therefore, the application of the act of
state doctrine can be viewed as legitimate or illegitimate, depending
65 W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l., 493 U.S. 400, 409
(1990).
66 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
67 See generally Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337
U.S. 530 (1949); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965);
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415 (1996); Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lock-
heed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
68 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
69 Id.
70 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725-26 (2004).
71 Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Na-
tions, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009);  Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disre-
garding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1239 n.27 (2007); see also
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
72 Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Ghosts of Horace Gray: Customary International Law as
Expectation in Human Rights Litigation, 97 KY. L.J. 615, 633 (2008).
73 Id. at 334.
74 Id. (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 78).
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on whether it is viewed under the revisionist or traditionalist theories
and whether it is viewed as procedural or substantive law.75
3. Exceptions to the Act of State Doctrine
Even though application of the act of state doctrine is discre-
tionary, the act of state doctrine has notable exceptions.76  One excep-
tion  was formulated in Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., which
states the act of state doctrine is inapplicable where the executive
branch has clearly indicated that it does not object to the court deter-
mining the validity of the foreign state’s act.77
Another exception, recognized only by a plurality in Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba,  is the commercial activities excep-
tion.78  Purely commercial obligations owed by a foreign state or one of
its instrumentalities are not an act of state wherein the act of state
doctrine would apply.79  Circuit courts are split as to whether they rec-
ognize the commercial activities exception.80  The Eleventh Circuit has
rejected the commercial activities exception.81  The Sixth Circuit ex-
pressed doubts as to the precedential value of an exception recognized
by a plurality opinion.82  The Third,83 Fifth,84 and Ninth85 Circuits
75 Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Ghosts of Horace Gray: Customary International Law as
Expectation in Human Rights Litigation, 97 KY. L.J. 615, 634-35 (2008).
76 Other common law jurisdictions have established public policy exceptions to the
act of state doctrine.  In Kuwait Airways Corp v. Iraqi Airways Co. (No. 4&5) the
House of Lords held that an act that “is in breach of clearly established principles
of public international law” does not fall under the act of state doctrine. Kuwait
Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Co. [2002] 2 AC 883, 949 (Lord Nicholls); see
also at 1108-11 (Lord Brooke).  The Federal Court of Australia has accepted that
public policy exception in Hicks v. Ruddock.  Hicks v. Ruddock (2007) 156 FCR
574, 600.
77 Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246, 249-50 (2d
Cir. 1947).
78 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
79 Id. at 695-705.
80 Jason E. Prince, Does ‘Act Of State’ Mean ‘Out Of Luck’?: The Perils Of Doing
Business With Foreign States And Their State-Owned Companies, 52-OCT ADVOC.
(Idaho) 21, 22 (2009).
81 Honduras Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v.  Honduras, 129 F.3d 543, 550 (11th Cir.
1997).
82 Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v.  Provisional Military Gov’t. of Socialist Ethi-
opia, 729 F.2d 422, 425 n.3 (6th Cir. 1984).
83 Envtl. Tectronics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1059 (3d Cir. 1988).
84 Airline Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, AFL-CIO, v. Taca Int’l Airlines,S.A., 748 F.2d 965,
970 n.2 (5th Cir. 1984).
85 Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 408 (9th
Cir. 1983).
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have mentioned the existence of the commercial activities exception
but have yet to state their position .86
4. Justifications for the Act of State Doctrine
In its early stages, the accepted justification for the act of state
doctrine was a conflicts of law argument.87  However, from a choice of
law perspective, “the act of state doctrine cannot be understood in any
coherent fashion.”88
Another related justification is international comity.89  Comity
of nations defines the extent with which the domestic laws of one coun-
try operate within another country.90  Comity is not mandatory.91  It is
a balance between recognition and consideration for other nations’ sov-
ereignty and the host nation’s citizens’ rights.92  Courts have ex-
pressed the opinion that determining the validity of acts by a different
country’s sovereign, instead of allowing conflicts to be resolved via dip-
lomatic channels, could have negative effects on the involved parties’
foreign relations.93  However, the justifications of conflicts of law and
86 Gregory Fox talks about a “private act exception.”  However, if there is no state
action, the elements of the act of state doctrine are not met and thus there is no
need for an exception. See Gregory H. Fox, Reexamining the Act of State Doctrine:
An Integrated Conflicts Analysis, 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 521, 533-34 (1992).
87 Melissa Waters, The U.S. Supreme Court and International Law: Continuity or
Change?,11 (manuscript) (on file with author); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §  41 (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
88 Gregory H. Fox, Reexamining the Act of State Doctrine: An Integrated Conflicts
Analysis, 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 521, 521 (1992).
89 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166 (1895)
All [of] the effect[s] which foreign laws can have in the territory
of a state depends absolutely on the express or tacit consent of
that state.  . . .  The express consent of a state to the application
of foreign laws within its territory is given by acts passed by its
legislative authority, or by treaties concluded with other states.
Its tacit consent is manifested by the decisions of its judicial and
administrative authorities, as well as by the writings of its publi-
cists.  There is no obligation recognized by legislators, public au-
thorities, and publicists to regard foreign laws; but their
application is admitted only from considerations of utility and
the mutual convenience of states,-‘ex comitate, ob reciprocam
utilitatem.’
Id. (quoting WHEAT. INT. LAW (8th Ed.) §§ 78, 79).
90 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 163-64.
93 See In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(citing Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918)).
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international comity were rejected by Sabbatino,94 which changed the
focus from those two rationales to domestic factors.95
One of the main contemporary justifications for the act of state
doctrine is separation of powers.  The act of state doctrine is a rule of
deference.96  This deference permits the executive power to take spe-
cial circumstances into account during negotiations, thus providing
the executive power with sufficient leeway to handle the resolution of
multiple cases or controversies at once.97
The act of state doctrine “is a reflection of the executive’s pri-
mary competency in foreign affairs, and an acknowledgment of the fact
that in passing upon foreign governmental acts the judiciary may hin-
der or embarrass the conduct of our foreign relations.”98  In Sabbatino,
the Court stated that if an issue is codified or if there is consensus
about that issue, then it is more appropriate for the judiciary to render
decisions regarding that issue.99  The Court also noted that when an
issue is especially relevant to the United States’ foreign relations,
there is greater justification for exclusivity within the executive and
legislative branches of government.100  Therefore, the act of state doc-
trine applies only to issues that fall within the exclusive power of the
executive or legislative branches.101
While this deference is based on constitutional underpinnings,
it is not required by the Constitution.102  Richard Falk103 equates the
deference used in applying the act of state doctrine to the deference
used in applying the political question doctrine in that it is derived
94 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 411-20, 470-471 (1964).
95 Patrick W. Pearsall, Note: Means/Ends Reciprocity in the Act of State Doctrine,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 999, 1008 (2005);  Melissa Waters, The U.S. Supreme
Court and International Law: Continuity or Change?, 11 (manuscript) (on file with
author); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100
YALE L.J. 2347, 2363 (1991).
96 See Richard A. Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal
Order, 75 (1964).
97 Id. at 9.
98 Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 108-09
(1971) (citing Sabbatino at 427-28, 431-33).
99 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 423-24.
102 Richard A. Falk, The Aftermath of Sabbatino.  Background Papers and Pro-
ceedings of the Hammarskjo¨ld Forum 17 (1965) (endnotes omitted).
103 Richard Falk is a professor at Princeton University who specializes in interna-
tional law. See generally Princeton Institute for International and Regional Stud-
ies, Associates – Richard Falk http://www.princeton.edu/~piirs/people/index.html.
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from the Constitution, but is not so integral to the Constitution that it
must always be applied.104
C. What Others Have Said Regarding the Similarities Between the
Act of State Doctrine and the Political Question Doctrine
The similarities between the act of state doctrine and the polit-
ical question doctrine have been mentioned on numerous occasions,
but have not been reconciled.  In First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, a case in which the Supreme Court held that the
act of state doctrine did not prevent litigation on the merits,105 Justice
Brennan applied the Bernstein exception in his dissent106 and stated
that the issue at hand was a political question.107  Justice White in his
dissent in Alfred Dunhill of London v. Cuba  also commented on the
similarities between the act of state doctrine and the political question
doctrine.108
The question of how to address the similarities between the po-
litical question doctrine and the act of state doctrine continues to be
debated in modern academia.  Michael Bazyler109 has proposed to re-
solve these similarities by doing away with the act of state doctrine.110
Thomas Sutcliffe has suggested the integration of the act of state doc-
trine into a broader analysis,111 without exactly describing what that
analysis would be.  Anne-Marie Slaughter112 criticizes Thomas
104 Richard A. Falk, The Aftermath of Sabbatino.  Background Papers and Pro-
ceedings of the Hammarskjo¨ld Forum 17 (1965) (endnotes omitted).
105 First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972).
106 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
107 First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. at 787-89 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
108 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 727 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting).
109 Michael Bazyler is a professor at Chapman University School of Law who spe-
cializes in international law. MICHAEL J. BAZYLER – BIOGRAPHY, CHAPMAN UNIVER-
SITY SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.chapman.edu/law/faculty/bazyler.asp (last
visited June 21, 2010).
110 See Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
325, 341 (1986).
111 Thomas Sutcliffe is a J.D. Candidate at Boston University School of Law, 2009.
See Thomas R. Sutcliffe, Comment, “The Nile Reconstituted”: Executive State-
ments, International Human Rights Litigation, and the Political Question Doc-
trine, 89 B.U. L. REV. 295, 327 (2009).
112 Anne-Marie Slaughter is a professor at Princeton University who specializes in
international law. See Anne-Marie Slaughter – Biography, Princeton University,
http://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/SlaughterCV2.pdf (last visited June 21,
2010).
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Franck’s113 failure to mention Justice Brennan’s114 characteriza-
tion.115  These efforts, however, have not been adopted by the courts,
which continue to try to find a way to address the similarities between
the act of state doctrine and the political question doctrine.
D. Contemporary Application of the Act of State and Political
Question Doctrines
Courts are not always at ease with the application of the act of
state doctrine and its connection with the political question doctrine.
The issue of the similarity between the act of state doctrine and the
political question doctrine was bought up by the Supreme Court in oral
arguments in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,116 where Justice Scalia117
suggested application of the act of state doctrine:
You know, there - I - I just don’t agree with you that
that’s - that’s the policy of the United States.  There -
apart from who can get into Federal court, there - there
is in Federal law a thing called the Act of State Doctrine
under which we will - we will honor and accept the action
of a foreign country conducted within its own borders
and will not allow that to be challenged in a suit in the
United States.  It’s a - it’s a longstanding doctrine, and
yet we do - certainly do not say that any time an act of
State is involved in a piece of litigation, there’s Federal
jurisdiction.118
Justice Scalia’s words suggest the fact that the attorneys liti-
gating the case did not include the act of state doctrine at any stage of
the proceedings up to the oral argument in the Supreme Court.119
Moreover, the quote shows the hesitation and difficulty with which the
113 Thomas Franck (1932-2009) was a professor at New York University School of
Law who specialized in international law.  Dennis Hevesi, Thomas Franck, Who
Advised Countries on Law, Dies at 77, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2009, at A12, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/30/nyregion/30franck.html (last visited June
21, 2010).
114 First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 787-89 (1972)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
115 See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are Foreign Affairs Different? 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1980, 2002 (1993) (reviewing Thomas M. Frank, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDI-
CIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992)).
116 Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
117 Justice Scalia is the author of one of the most recent opinions by the Supreme
Court on the act of state doctrine: W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics
Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
118 Transcript of Oral Argument at 13-14, Dole, 538 U.S. 468 (No. 01-593).
119 See id.
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existence of the act of state doctrine and its application to the case was
suggested.120
In recent cases, courts have been considering both the political
question doctrine and the act of state doctrine as if they were the same
or very similar.121  In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, the Ninth Circuit recently
referred to the act of state doctrine and the political question doctrine
and stated that “a federal court has leeway to choose among threshold
grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.”122  In In re
Yukos Oil, the court pointed out that the act of state doctrine can be
viewed both as a rule of decision and a principle of abstention.123  In
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., the act of
state doctrine, the political question doctrine, and comity of nations
are treated together as requiring the assertion of the relevant foreign
policy of the executive branch and interference with that policy.124
As one district court has observed, in determining
whether to invoke the act of state, political question or
comity of nations doctrines, the court must first ascer-
tain the relevant foreign policy of the executive branch,
and then assess whether adjudication of the claims
before it will unduly interfere with that policy.  In con-
ducting this analysis, the court must accept the state-
ment of foreign policy provided by the executive branch
as conclusive of its view of that subject; it may not assess
whether the policy articulated is wise or unwise, or
whether it is based on misinformation or faulty
reasoning.125
It seems that it would not matter whether the parties assert
the act of state doctrine or the political question doctrine; the result
will be that the court cannot interfere with the policy asserted by the
executive power.126
120 See id.
121 See supra 117-120 and accompanying text. See infra notes 122-139 and accom-
panying text.
122 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 825 n.1, (citing Sinochem Int’l Co. v.
Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, (2007)).
123 In re Yukos Oil Co. Sec. Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78067, at *22 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); see In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 558-59
(E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Nocula v. UGS Corp., 520 F.3d 719, 728 (2008).
124 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18399, at *22 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766 (1972)).
125 Id.
126 See id.
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In Austria. v. Altmann, the Supreme Court raises the issue of
whether the act of state doctrine is a jurisdictional procedural defense
or a substantive defense on the merits.127  In Sharon v. Time, Inc., the
District Court for the Southern District of New York also observed the
similarities between the act of state doctrine and the political question
doctrine.128  The court emphasized the similarities in the Supreme
Court analysis when determining justiciability under both doc-
trines.129  The court also underscored the similarities of the considera-
tions weighed and the process used in weighing those considerations
on a case-by-case basis when determining whether a judicial or a polit-
ical decision is best.130
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was more direct in
asserting that the act of state doctrine is a doctrine of justiciability and
not a jurisdictional doctrine.131  In United Bank, Ltd. v. Cosmic Inter-
national, Inc., the court stated that “[t]he act of state doctrine is the
equivalent in international law of the ‘political question doctrine’, and
was devised to prevent intrusion by our courts into the political affairs
of foreign countries.”132  A different court, when analyzing the defer-
ence that should be accorded to a United States Statement of Interest
in a case, referred to the application under the political question
doctrine.133
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has stated that:
The act of state doctrine is similar to the political
question doctrine in domestic law.  It requires that the
courts defer to the legislative and executive branches
when those branches are better equipped to resolve a po-
litically sensitive question.  Like the political question
doctrine, its applicability is not subject to clear defini-
tion.  The courts balance various factors to determine
whether the doctrine should apply.134
In Matar v. Dichter, the court noted that because the political
question doctrine was sufficient to dismiss the case, it did not need to
127 Rep. of Aus. V. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700-01 (2004).
128 Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
129 Id. at 547 (citing Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1918))
130 Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. at 548.
131 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia,
218 F.3d 152, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2000).
132 United Bank, Ltd. v. Cosmic Int’l, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 262, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
133 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289,
347 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
134 Int’l Ass’n. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, (IAM) v. Org. of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), 649 F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1981).
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consider the act of state doctrine.135  In Mujica v. Occidental Petro-
leum Corp., after weighing four factors the court decided that the act of
state doctrine did not apply and instead applied the political question
doctrine.136
These cases show that there is a tendency in contemporary
cases to consider the act of state doctrine and the political question
doctrine simultaneously and evaluate them at the same time, using
similar reasoning.137  These cases also illustrate the confusion in the
application of and justifications for the act of state doctrine.138  This
article will determine how simplifying the use of justiciability doc-
trines in cases involving foreign affairs can be accomplished by exam-
ining the application and justifications of the political question
doctrine and the act of state doctrine.139
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
In recent years, there has been an increased amount of incorpo-
ration of principles from international law into domestic law.140  The
act of state doctrine, however, is not a rule of international law that
has been internalized, but is a rule of domestic law that has effects in
the international arena.141  However, the fact that the act of state doc-
trine is not in itself a rule of international law but rather is a domestic
law that internalizes principles of international law does not make at-
torneys and judges less adverse to its application.142 One way for U.S.
135 Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284, 296 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
136 Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1190-95 (2005).
137 See supra notes 117-136 and accompanying text.
138 See id.
139 See infra Part V.
140 Thomas H. Lee, The Civil War in U.S. Foreign Relations Law: A Dress Re-
hearsal for Modern Transformations, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 53, 53 (2008).
Regardless of one’s position in this debate, it seems fair to
say that all discussion so far has been confined to the question of
change and continuity in the domestic Constitution.  By ‘domes-
tic’ I mean the Constitution as it applies to the regulation of: (1)
relations among the three branches of the national government
in their governance of the country (separation of powers); (2) re-
lations between national and state governments (federalism);
and (3) the relations between the government (both national and
state) and American citizens (individual rights).
Id.
141 Foreign sovereign immunity can be interpreted as a norm of international law
that countries have internalized. See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lec-
ture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 668 (1998).
142 See Thomas M. Franck, Dr. Pangloss Meets the Grinch: A Pessimistic Comment
on Harold Koh’s Optimism, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 686 (1998).
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courts to use more principles of international law is to incorporate
these principles into domestic law.143  The Supreme Court has not tra-
ditionally decided cases on the status of international law in the do-
mestic arena, generally leaving those issues to be debated by the lower
courts and academics.144
Incorporating the act of state doctrine under the political ques-
tion doctrine would permit courts to address questions of international
law more easily by characterizing issues in a case as questions of do-
mestic law with which attorneys and judges are familiar.145  Instead of
having to argue both the political question doctrine and the act of state
doctrine, attorneys could just argue the political question doctrine.146
Then, courts could analyze the political question doctrine and the act
of state doctrine at the same time without devoting space in the opin-
ion to a discussion concerning which doctrine is applicable to the
case.147  Thus, courts would be more likely to apply the act of state
doctrine where it is pertinent.148
IV. ANALYSIS
In order to analyze the viability of incorporating the act of state
doctrine into the political question doctrine this section will consider
the hurdles that would be involved in such unification.  First, this sec-
tion will analyze whether there are constitutional obstacles to the
union of the act of state doctrine and the political question doctrine.149
Second, this section will analyze whether the political question doc-
143 See id. at 695.
144 Gregory H. Fox, Reexamining the Act of State Doctrine: An Integrated Conflicts
Analysis, 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 521, 521 (1992).
145 Id.  This is in part because of the lack of focus on international law in Ameri-
can legal education.  In 1960, only 75 out of 124 law schools offered a course re-
lated to international law. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW, A SURVEY OF COURSES OFFERED IN THE LAW
SCHOOLS OF THE UNITED STATES IN INTERNATIONAL AND RELATED SUBJECTS 1-2
(1960).  Fordham Law School did not include courses in international law on a
permanent basis until 1962.  Joseph C. Sweeney, International Law at Fordham
Law School 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1139, 1142-43 (2006).  In 1991, less than 45% of
law students took a class related to international law. JOHN KING GAMBLE, TEACH-
ING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 1990S 122-23 (1993).  However, there is a trend of
schools offering and requiring courses related to international law, and more at-
torneys and judges in the future will be well versed in international law. See John
King Gamble, Teaching or Get off the Lectern: Impediments to Improving Interna-




149 See infra Part IV A.
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trine exists and, if so, what its scope is with regard to the act of state
doctrine.150  Third, this section will consider why the suggestions to
abolish the act of state doctrine are not advisable.151  Fourth, this sec-
tion will consider the impact that incorporating the act of state doc-
trine into the political question doctrine would have on the issues
raised on cases analyzing both doctrines.152  Finally, this section will
analyze the impact of the incorporation of the act of state doctrine into
the political question doctrine regarding the problem presented to the
act of state doctrine by Erie v. Tompkins.153
Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in Baker v.
Carr,154 wrote a dissenting opinion in First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, in which he stated that Sabbatino held that
the validity of an act of state is a political question.155
In short, Sabbatino held that the validity of a for-
eign act of state in certain circumstances is a “political
question” not cognizable in our courts.  Only one - and
not necessarily the most important - of those circum-
stances concerned the possible impairment of the Execu-
tive’s conduct of foreign affairs.  Even if this factor were
absent in this case because of the Legal Adviser’s state-
ment of position, it would hardly follow that the act of
state doctrine should not foreclose judicial review of the
expropriation of petitioner’s properties.  To the contrary,
the absence of consensus on the applicable international
rules, the unavailability of standards from a treaty or
other agreement, the existence and recognition of the
Cuban Government, the sensitivity of the issues to na-
tional concerns, and the power of the Executive alone to
effect a fair remedy for all United States citizens who
have been harmed all point toward the existence of a “po-
litical question.”  The Legal Adviser’s letter does not pur-
port to affect these considerations at all.  In any event,
when coupled with the possible consequences to the con-
duct of our foreign relations explored above, these con-
siderations compel application of the act of state
doctrine, notwithstanding the Legal Adviser’s suggestion
to the contrary.  The Executive Branch, however, exten-
150 See infra Part IV B.
151 See infra Part IV C.
152 See infra Part IV D.
153 See infra Part IV E.
154 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962).
155 First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 787-89 (1972)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sive its powers in the area of foreign affairs, cannot by
simple stipulation change a political question into a cog-
nizable claim.156
This position was echoed by Justice White in Alfred Dunhill of London
v. Cuba.157
Some authors have criticized Justice Brennan for not fully ex-
plaining the reasoning behind this assertion.158  “Justice Brennan did
not explain why, if the act of state and political question doctrines
were equivalent, act of state issues cannot simply be subsumed under
the political question analysis.”159  In this section, this article will pro-
vide arguments discussing why the act of state doctrine should fall
under the political question doctrine umbrella.
A. Constitutional Underpinnings
Both the political question doctrine and the act of state doc-
trine are based on constitutional underpinnings.160  This section will
first analyze how the factors of the political question doctrine relate to
the act of state doctrine; then, this section will analyze how the justifi-
cations for the political question doctrine and the act of state doctrine
interrelate.
The factors that courts take into account, when deciding
whether a case falls within the political question doctrine, are:
1. “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department.”161  In the case of the act of
state doctrine there is authority suggesting that issues concerning for-
eign affairs are reserved for the executive branch.162
2. “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it.”163  Due to the complexity of issues concerning foreign
156 Id.
157 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 727 (1976) (White J.,
dissenting).
158 See Bazyler, supra note 110, at 341; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are
Foreign Affairs Different? 106 HARV. L. REV. 1980, 2002 (1993) (reviewing Thomas
M. Frank, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW AP-
PLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992)); Thomas R. Sutcliffe, “The Nile Reconstituted”:
Executive Statements, International Human Rights Litigation, and the Political
Question Doctrine, 89 B.U. L. REV. 295, 327 (2009).
159 Daniel C. K. Chow, Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine: An Analysis in Terms
of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 62 WASH. L. REV. 397, 438 (1987).
160 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
161 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
162 See Richard A. Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal
Order 9 (1964).
163 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
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affairs, the executive branch may be better equipped to resolve multi-
ple cases or controversies at once through diplomacy.164
3. “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy deter-
mination of a kind clearly for [non-judicial] discretion.”165  This factor
seems vague, but it is integral to both the political question doctrine
and the act of state doctrine: whether there is a policy rationale that
would favor judicial restraint concerning issues with implications for
foreign affairs.166
4. “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent reso-
lution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government.”167 This factor is linked to the lack of a judicially dis-
coverable standards factor; because the executive branch is better
suited for resolving disputes concerning foreign affairs, that branch
should handle such disputes.168
5. “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made.”169  The act of state doctrine concerns the polit-
ical decisions of another country.170  The United States could have
taken a position on those decisions, but that is not necessarily the
case.
6. “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.”171  This is the
factor that has often been quoted when applying both the act of state
doctrine and the political question doctrine, and again, this factor in-
volves policy considerations.172
The justifications for the political question doctrine as applied
to foreign affairs are based on considerations of separation of powers
and the need for the nation to speak with one voice on certain matters
regarding foreign affairs.173  The justifications for the act of state doc-
164 See In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 558-59 (E.D.N.Y.
2008) (citing Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918)); see also
Richard A. Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order 9
(1964).
165 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
166 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
167 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
168 See In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 558-59 (citing Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918)); see also RICHARD A. FALK, THE
ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 9 (1964).
169 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
170 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
171 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
172 See supra notes 29, 98 and accompanying text.
173 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302; see also  Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. at 212 n.31. “The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is com-
mitted by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative [branches] . . .  and the
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trine are also based on questions of separation of powers and the need
for the nation to speak with one voice in certain matters concerning
foreign affairs.174  Hence, both doctrines are supported by notions of
separation of powers and the need for the nation to speak with one
voice in certain matters concerning foreign affairs.175  Both doctrines
are discretionary, in the sense that they do not apply to all questions
concerning foreign affairs, but only to those that the courts consider
committed to the other political branches.176
The act of state doctrine fits both the classical and the pruden-
tial theories of the political question doctrine.177  Under the classical
theory, certain issues concerning foreign relations have been constitu-
tionally committed to the executive or the legislative powers.178
Under the prudential theory, it is considered better to leave certain
issues concerning foreign relations to the executive or legislative
powers.179
B. Existence and Scope of the Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine is broad.180  According to Hen-
kin, the political question doctrine encompasses several doctrines.
Henkin maintains that the doctrine is an illusion that masks the fol-
lowing principles listed below:
1. The courts are bound to accept decisions by the politi-
cal branches within their constitutional authority.  2.
The courts will not find limitations or prohibitions on the
powers of the political branches where the Constitution
does not prescribe any.  3. Not all constitutional limita-
tions or prohibitions imply rights and standing to object
in favor of private parties.  4. The courts may refuse
some (or all) remedies for want of equity.  5. In principle,
finally, there might be constitutional provisions which
can properly be interpreted as wholly or in part “self-
monitoring” and not the subject of judicial review.181
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject
to judicial inquiry or decision.”
174 See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 28-29, 58-65 and accompanying text.
176 See id.
177 See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
178 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
179 See supra note 40-41 and accompanying text.
180 See Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 1331, 1397 (1995).
181 Henkin, supra note 33, at 622-23.
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The aforementioned principles may have all predated and
could all be included in what is now the political question doctrine.182
However, it would be more complicated to recognize and apply these
principles by themselves on a case-by-case basis than to apply the po-
litical question doctrine as it is applied now.183
Redish184 maintained that Korematsu v. United States185 was
decided as if Korematsu involved a political question issue, even when
the Court did not state so expressly.186  Unlike Henkin’s conclusion,187
this does not mean that the political question doctrine does not exist;
instead it indicates that the political question doctrine constitutes a
broad umbrella under which several theories based on the separation
of powers, constitutional structure, and the need of the executive to act
unilaterally can be applied with one name.
The view of the political question doctrine as a structure under
which several theories can be applied is beneficial because this view
does not constrain it to the doctrines that are currently applied under
the doctrine’s name, but instead provides the courts with flexibility re-
garding the application of the political question doctrine to cases.
Courts would be able to expand the application of the political question
doctrine and include more doctrines under its umbrella, provided that
there is a constitutional commitment of a power to a political branch.
These similarities should not lead us, as it has led others,188 to
conclude that the act of state doctrine should not exist.  Instead, it
would be more practical to apply the act of state doctrine as a part of
the political question doctrine.189  Whenever the courts find an issue
that they believe should not be decided by the judiciary because it is
within the domain of the executive or the legislative powers, the court
would only need to refuse to adjudicate the issue under the political
question doctrine, which would include the act of state doctrine.
182 See id.
183 See supra notes 116-39 and accompanying text.
184 Martin Redish is a professor at Northwestern University School of Law who
specializes in federal courts, civil procedure, freedom of expression and constitu-
tional law.  Martin Redish – Biography, Northwestern Law School, http://www.
law.northwestern.edu/faculty/profiles/MartinRedish.
185 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
186 Redish, supra note 25, at 1039.
187 See Henkin, supra note 33.
188 See Bazyler, supra note 110, at 330-31 nn.22-25.
189 See Henkin, supra note 33.
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C. Why Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine Would Not Work
Michael Bazyler has suggested eliminating the act of state doc-
trine and using the political question doctrine instead.190  Thomas
Sutcliffe has suggested integrating the act of state doctrine into a
broader analysis191 without exactly describing what that analysis
would be.  These proposals would result in more confusion and could
lead the courts to decide cases in which a foreign sovereign has acted
within its own territory, thus interfering with foreign affairs policy.192
Therefore, it would be more pragmatic to clarify the application of the
act of state doctrine than to abolish it.193
D. Recent Issues Concerning the Political Question Doctrine and the
Act of State Doctrine in Foreign Affairs
In recent cases, both theories have been invoked at the same
time, and in most cases, both theories were rejected by the courts for
similar reasons.194  Recent cases analyzing the application of the act of
state doctrine are consistent with treating the act of state doctrine as a
part of the political question doctrine.195
Most of those cases refer to the similarities of both doctrines
which arise in the application of, classification of, and grounds for both
doctrines.196  Issues include whether the act of state doctrine is a rule
of decision, a jurisdictional rule, or a justiciability issue.197  Another
issue is whether a court must ascertain the foreign policy of the execu-
190 See Bazyler, supra note 110, at 341.
191 See Thomas R. Sutcliffe, “The Nile Reconstituted”: Executive Statements, Inter-
national Human Rights Litigation, and the Political Question Doctrine, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 295, 327 (2009).
192 Andrew D. Patterson, The Act of State Doctrine Is Alive and Well: Why Critics
of the Doctrine are Wrong, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 111, 113, 154-55
(2008).
193 Id. at 155.
194 See supra notes 116-39 and accompanying text.
195 Id.
196 See Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 548 (1984); United Bank, Ltd. v.
Cosmic International, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 262, 269 (1975); Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (2003); Transcript of Oral
Argument at 13-14, Dole, 538 U.S. 468 (2003) (No. 01-593).
197 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 825 n.1 (2008) (citing Sinochem Int’l
Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422(2007)); In re Yukos Oil Co. Sec.
Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78067, at *22  n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006);see also
Rep. of Aus. v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700-01 (2004); Nocula v. UGS Corp., 520
F.3d 719, 728 (2008); In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 558-59
(E.D.N.Y. 2008).
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tive branch before applying the act of state doctrine.198  Rather than
debate which doctrine should apply199 or suggest a doctrine that coun-
sel did not argue to the court,200 courts could analyze both the act of
state doctrine and the political question doctrine at the same time.201
As recent cases analyze the act of state doctrine and the politi-
cal question doctrine simultaneously, and the methodological difficul-
ties appear to be in distinguishing each doctrine, it would simplify the
application  of the doctrines to analyze them together.202  Since the po-
litical question doctrine is broader than the act of state doctrine, the
political question doctrine should encompass the act of state
doctrine.203
E. Solving an Erie Problem
Moreover, applying the act of state doctrine as part of the polit-
ical question doctrine could solve the uncertainty concerning the Erie
problem204 by interpreting the act of state doctrine as a justiciability
issue, and therefore a procedural issue.  Under the Erie doctrine, the
forum non coveniens doctrine has been found to be procedural.205  Sim-
ilarly, justiciability standards are procedural for the purposes of the
Erie doctrine.206  Therefore, because the political question doctrine is
not to be governed by state law under the Erie doctrine, if the act of
state doctrine was applicable under the political question doctrine,
there would be no doubt as to its validity after Erie.207
V. PROPOSAL
This article’s proposal is that courts in the United States
should apply the act of state doctrine as part of the political question
doctrine.  Courts are considering the political question doctrine and
the act of state doctrine at the same time, as justiciability issues.
Whenever the courts find an issue that they believe should not be de-
198 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18399, at *22  n.9 (2005) (citing Sarei, at 1181-82).
199 See supra notes 116-139 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
201 See infra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
202 See id.
203 See Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 1331, 1397 (1995).
204 See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
205 See Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F.2d 883, 887 (1946).; Shulman v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 152 F. Supp. 833, 835 (1957); Ultra Sucro Co. v. Il.
Water Treatment Co., 146 F. Supp. 393, 396-97 (1956).
206 Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595, 633 (2008).
207 See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
2010] A POLITICAL ACT OF STATE QUESTION 497
cided by the judiciary because it is within the domain of the executive
or legislative powers, the court would only need to refuse to adjudicate
under the political question doctrine, which would include the act of
state doctrine.  This would simplify the application of justiciability
doctrines.
When handling a case involving foreign affairs, the attorneys
presenting and the judge deciding the issue should ask themselves the
following preliminary questions:  1. Has the power implicated in this
particular case been constitutionally committed to the executive or leg-
islative branches of government, in that if a judge decides this case,
the reasoning or outcome of the case would interfere with the separa-
tion of powers structure that is inherent in the Constitution?208  2. Is
there a need for the country to speak with one voice on this issue?  3.
Has a foreign sovereign acted within its own territory?
If the answer to the first two questions is yes, then the applica-
tion of political question doctrine should be considered.  If all three
questions are answered in the affirmative, then both the political ques-
tion doctrine and the act of state doctrine are applicable, and both
should be considered together.
Furthermore, the third question can be replaced by different
questions for other kinds of cases concerning foreign affairs, thus pro-
viding courts with the flexibility to add new categories under the polit-
ical question umbrella.  For example, the third question could be: Does
this case involve the writ of habeas corpus?209  If so, then according to
Boumediene v. Bush210 this case does not involve a political ques-
tion.211  In cases concerning antitrust issues wherein the effects doc-
trine212 would apply, the third question could be: Would there be a
direct and substantial effect on U.S. commerce?213
VI. CONCLUSION
After examining the justifications and applications of the polit-
ical question doctrine in cases involving foreign affairs, this article
208 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
209 Habeas corpus is a writ used to bring a person before a court in order to ensure
that a person’s detention or imprisonment is not illegal. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
728 (8th ed. 2004).
210 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
211 See David Jenkins, Habeas Corpus and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction After
Boumediene: Towards a Doctrine of “Effective Control” in the United States, 9
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 306, 319-20 (2009).
212 The effects doctrine allows courts in the United States to apply antitrust laws
when the acts involved have effects in the United States. See Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America, Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n. 549 F.2d 597, 610 (1976).
213 Id.
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concludes that the act of state doctrine should be a subcategory of the
political question doctrine.  This article’s proposal of a framework can
be applied to cases involving political questions in foreign affairs,
which may help simplify the complex judicial decisions inherent in
these cases.
